In Robert Piatt v. Charles Vattier and Others, the Supreme Court of the United States heard a case involving an appeal by Robert Piatt from a judgment rendered against him in favor of The Bank of the United States. At issue was whether or not certain notes issued to Mr. Piatt were validly endorsed by his agent, John Biddle, who had been authorized to endorse them on behalf of Mr. Piatt for payment at The Bank of the United States. After considering all evidence presented before it, including testimony from both parties as well as documents submitted into evidence, the court determined that there was sufficient proof that John Biddle had acted with authority when he endorsed these notes and thus they were validly endorsed for payment at The Bank of the United States; therefore upholding its original decision in favor of The Bank and affirming judgment against Mr.Piatt accordingly .

In the case of Robert Piatt v. Charles Vattier and Others, and The Bank of the United States, Justice McLean delivered a dissenting opinion. He argued that although it was true that Congress had not granted any authority to state legislatures to pass laws impairing contracts between individuals, this did not mean they were prohibited from doing so. In his view, states have inherent powers which are independent of those delegated by Congress; thus he believed that states could still pass such laws if they chose to do so without violating the Constitution's Contract Clause or other provisions protecting contract rights. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that an act passed by Ohio in 1831 impaired Piatt’s contract with Vattier because there was no evidence presented at trial showing how exactly it affected their agreement. Finally, Justice McLean concluded that even if Ohio had violated its own law when passing this act – as alleged by Piatt – then his remedy would be found under state law rather than federal constitutional principles since these matters should remain within each individual state’s jurisdiction unless expressly authorized otherwise by Congress itself.