In Pinter v. Dahl, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a case involving securities law in 1987. The dispute arose when William Dahl, an oil and gas lease investor, sued Harry Pinter and others for selling him unregistered securities in violation of the Securities Act of 1933. The defendants argued that they were not statutory sellers because they did not pass title to Dahl; instead, he received his interests directly from landowners after negotiating with them independently. The court held that a person is considered a seller under Section 12(1) if he or she either passes title or "successfully solicits" the purchase of securities for financial gain - meaning those who persuade others to buy can be liable even if they do not formally transfer ownership themselves. However, it also clarified that mere participation in related transactions does not necessarily make one a seller unless there's proof of solicitation specifically intended to induce purchases. This decision significantly expanded potential liability under federal security laws by including individuals who may have indirectly influenced investment decisions without being directly involved in sales transactions.

In the dissenting opinion for Pinter v. Dahl, Justice White disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Section 12(1) of the Securities Act. He argued that it was not necessary for a person to be an actual seller in order to be held liable under this section. Instead, he believed that anyone who substantially participated or had a significant role in soliciting the sale could also be held accountable. This would include individuals who motivated others to sell securities through fraudulent means even if they did not directly make any sales themselves. Furthermore, Justice White criticized the majority’s decision as being too narrow and restrictive which may potentially allow wrongdoers to escape liability by simply avoiding direct involvement in selling activities while still playing crucial roles behind-the-scenes.