In the case of Plamals v. S.S. Pinar Del Rio, 1927, the United States Supreme Court ruled on a matter involving maritime law and liability for damaged cargo. The plaintiff, Plamals, had shipped goods aboard the defendant's vessel (S.S. Pinar Del Rio), which was subsequently sunk by another ship in New York Harbor due to negligence from both vessels involved in the collision. The issue at hand was whether or not an "exception clause" within a bill of lading could absolve carriers from their responsibility over lost or damaged goods caused by negligent navigation or management of their vessel. The court held that such clauses were contrary to public policy and therefore invalid under U.S federal maritime law - specifically Section 3 of the Harter Act (1893). This act stipulates that ship owners cannot contract away their obligation to use due diligence in properly loading and stowing cargo as well as making sure ships are seaworthy prior to departure. This ruling reinforced carrier accountability for damage resulting from navigational errors while also clarifying how exception clauses should be interpreted within bills of lading under American maritime law.

In the dissenting opinion for PLAMALS v. S.S. PINAR DEL RIO, Justice Stone argued that the majority's decision to dismiss a case due to lack of jurisdiction was incorrect and inconsistent with previous court rulings. He contended that under maritime law, an in rem action could be brought against a ship even if its owner was not within the court's jurisdiction at the time of filing suit. In his view, this principle should apply regardless of whether or not there is also an in personam claim against the shipowner involved in addition to an in rem claim against their vessel itself. Therefore, he disagreed with dismissing cases simply because they were filed while ships were on high seas rather than when docked at port within U.S territory as required by traditional admiralty rules.