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Pollard and Pickett v. Dwight et al. was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1807 that dealt with the issue of admiralty jurisdiction over land-based contracts. The plaintiffs, Pollard and Pickett, were merchants who had entered into a contract to purchase goods from defendants Dwight et al., which they alleged had been breached when the defendants failed to deliver them as promised. The plaintiffs sought damages for breach of contract under admiralty law rather than common law because their agreement involved maritime commerce between two different states (Massachusetts and New York). In its ruling, the court held that admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to such cases involving land-based contracts; instead, it found that only those agreements related directly to navigation or shipping on navigable waters could be adjudicated under federal maritime laws. As such, this decision established an important precedent limiting the scope of federal courts' power over commercial disputes occurring within state boundaries
In Pollard and Pickett v. Dwight et al., the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over an admiralty case involving a dispute between two citizens of different states, one from Virginia and one from Massachusetts. The majority opinion held that the state court did not have jurisdiction in this matter because it involved interstate commerce, which is exclusively regulated by Congress under Article III of the Constitution. However, Justice William Johnson dissented on this point, arguing that although Congress has exclusive authority to regulate interstate commerce, there are certain matters within its scope which may be subject to concurrent regulation by both federal and state governments. In particular he argued that disputes between citizens of different states should be heard in their respective home courts as long as those courts do not interfere with or contradict any laws passed by Congress regarding such matters. He concluded his dissent stating “it would seem more consonant with justice” for these cases to be decided at home rather than having them removed into another forum where they will become entangled in technicalities foreign to their nature."