In Polleys v. Black River Improvement Company, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to grant an injunction against a corporation that was operating a dam on a navigable river. The plaintiff, Polleys, owned land downstream from the dam and argued that the dam was causing flooding on his property. The defendant, Black River Improvement Company, argued that the state court did not have the authority to grant an injunction against the corporation because the river was a navigable waterway and thus was subject to federal regulation. The Supreme Court held that the state court did have the authority to grant an injunction against the corporation. The Court reasoned that the river was a navigable waterway, but that the state court had the authority to grant an injunction because the corporation was operating the dam in a manner that was causing damage to the plaintiff's property. The Court noted that the state court had the authority to protect the rights of the plaintiff, even if the river was a navigable waterway. The Court also noted that the state court had the authority to regulate the activities of the corporation in order to protect the rights of the plaintiff. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court had the authority to grant an injunction against the corporation operating the dam on the navigable river. The Court reasoned that the state court had the authority to protect the rights of the plaintiff, even if the river was a navigable waterway. The Court also noted that the state court had the authority to regulate the activities of the corporation in order to protect the rights of the plaintiff.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Polleys v. Black River Improvement Company, which concerned a dispute over whether certain lands were subject to taxation by the state of Wisconsin. He argued that the majority had misapplied earlier Supreme Court decisions and failed to consider relevant facts about how these lands were acquired and used. Field noted that while it was true that Congress had granted certain rights to navigable rivers, this did not mean that all adjacent land was automatically exempt from taxation as well; rather, he believed there must be some connection between the use of such land and its exemption from taxes. Furthermore, he pointed out that even if Congress intended for such exemptions to apply broadly across states like Wisconsin, it would have been more explicit in doing so than what they actually wrote into their legislation. Ultimately, Justice Field concluded his dissent by arguing against granting tax exemptions without clear evidence or congressional intent supporting them.