In the case of Elisha R. Potter v. Hannah Gardner and Others, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a deed from an individual to another could be voided if it had been made under duress or coercion by one party against another. The appellant, Elisha R. Potter, argued that he had been coerced into signing a deed transferring property to Hannah Gardner and others due to threats of violence from them; however, the lower court found in favor of Gardner and her co-defendants on grounds that there was no evidence presented which proved such coercion occurred at all. On appeal before the Supreme Court, Justice Story held that while mere verbal threats may not constitute sufficient proof for voiding a contract between two parties without further evidence being provided as support for those claims; in this particular instance where physical force was used against Mr. Potter during negotiations leading up to him signing said deed - coupled with his own testimony regarding fear instilled upon him by defendants’ actions - were enough reasonable cause for overturning lower court’s ruling in favor of Mrs. Gardner et al., thus allowing Mr. Potter's claim to stand as validly proven before law courts so long as other elements necessary for establishing legal validity are met accordingly thereafter

In the case of Elisha R. Potter vs Hannah Gardner and Others, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a deed from a father to his son should be considered valid even though it had not been recorded in accordance with state law. The majority opinion held that since the deed had not been properly recorded, it could not be enforced by either party. However, Justice Story dissented from this decision on two grounds: firstly, he argued that there was no evidence that recording deeds was required by any statute or common law; secondly, he maintained that if such a requirement did exist then it would have constituted an unconstitutional infringement upon private property rights as guaranteed under Article I of the United States Constitution. He concluded by stating "I am therefore constrained to dissent from this judgment."