Term: 2010
Docket: 09-658
Jeff Premo, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, Petitioner v. Randy Joseph Moore
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09-658 PREMO V. MOORE DECISION BELOW: 574 F.3d 1092 JUSTICE KAGAN TOOK NO PART CERT. GRANTED 3/22/2010 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. This Court established in Hill v. Lockhart the standard for assessing, in a collateral challenge to a conviction that was based on a guilty or no-contest plea, whether an attorney's deficient performance requires reversal of a conviction. In Arizona v. Fulminante--a direct appellate review case--this Court reviewed all the evidence presented at trial and held that the erroneous admission of a coerced confession at the trial was not harmless. a. If a collateral challenge is based on a defense attorney's decision not to move to suppress a confession prior to a guilty or no contest plea, does the Fulminante standard apply, even though no record of a trial is available for review? b. Even if the Fulminante standard applies in that context, is it "clearly established Federal law" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)? 2. In Moore's underlying criminal case, he confessed to police that he personally shot the victim. He also confessed to two other people, and he ultimately pleaded no contest to murder. In his collateral challenge to his conviction, he alleged that his attorney should have moved to suppress the confession to police, but he offered no evidence that he would have insisted on going to trial had counsel done so. Did the Ninth Circuit err by granting federal habeas relief on Moore's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-15713
The U.S. Supreme Court case Jeff Premo, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary v. Randy Joseph Moore (2010) revolved around the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel during a plea bargain process. The respondent, Randy Moore was convicted for murder in 1995 and later filed a habeas corpus petition claiming that his attorney did not adequately represent him by failing to move for suppression of his confession prior to advising him to accept a plea deal. Both the District Court and Ninth Circuit granted relief on this claim but it was reversed by the Supreme Court in 2011 with Justice Kennedy delivering the opinion of an unanimous court stating that even if Moore's lawyer had moved to suppress his confession before he pleaded guilty, there is no reasonable probability that doing so would have led to any different outcome given overwhelming evidence against him including another participant’s detailed account corroborating Moore's own admission.
In the dissenting opinion for JEFF PREMO, SUPERINTENDENT, OREGON STATE PENITENTIARY v. RANDY JOSEPH MOORE (2010), Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that Moore's counsel was ineffective due to his failure to file a motion to suppress Moore's incriminating statements made without Miranda warnings. She contended that this case should not have been evaluated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) because it involved an application of Strickland v. Washington rather than clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. The majority’s decision, she believed, failed to properly apply Strickland’s prejudice prong which requires showing a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. She also disagreed with their conclusion about what constituted 'prejudice' in this context and felt they had set too high a bar for defendants seeking relief based on ineffective assistance claims.
