Prentice v. Stearns was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court could enforce a contract that was made in violation of a state statute. The case involved a contract between two parties, Prentice and Stearns, in which Prentice agreed to pay Stearns a certain amount of money for the sale of a piece of property. The contract was made in violation of a state statute that prohibited the sale of property for more than its appraised value. The Supreme Court held that the state court could not enforce the contract because it was made in violation of the state statute. The Court reasoned that the state statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power and that the state had the right to protect its citizens from contracts that were made in violation of the law. The Court also noted that the state had the right to protect its citizens from contracts that were made in bad faith or with the intent to defraud. The Court's decision in Prentice v. Stearns established that state courts could not enforce contracts that were made in violation of state statutes. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then and has been used to support the idea that state courts should not enforce contracts that are made in violation of the law.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Prentice v. Stearns, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and should be reversed. He argued that a contract between two parties is not invalidated by an intervening law if it does not conflict with public policy or morals, as long as it has been executed before such a law comes into effect. In this case, he argued that there was no evidence of fraud or illegality in the original contract between Prentice and Stearns; therefore, any subsequent legislation could not render their agreement void. Furthermore, Justice Field contended that even if such legislation had been passed prior to execution of the contract at issue here, its provisions would still have applied only prospectively unless otherwise specified by Congress itself. As such, he concluded that since no statute existed which prohibited contracts like those made between Prentice and Stearns when they entered into theirs - nor did one exist afterwards - their agreement remained valid despite later laws prohibiting similar contracts from being formed thereafter.