In the case of Press Publishing Company v. Monroe in 1896, the U.S Supreme Court ruled on a libel suit brought by George W. Monroe against The New York World newspaper (owned by Press Publishing Company). The paper had published an article accusing him of fraudulent activities while he was serving as a public official in Kentucky. However, it turned out that there were two individuals named George W. Monroe living in Kentucky at that time and the allegations were intended for the other individual who held no public office. The court decided to uphold an award of damages to plaintiff George W. Monroe, ruling that even though his full name was used in the publication, other identifying information made it clear they meant him specifically - thus causing damage to his reputation due to mistaken identity. This decision established precedent regarding defamation cases where misidentification occurs; if enough specific details are provided which could reasonably lead people acquainted with someone to believe they are being referred to – despite incorrect facts – then grounds for libel may exist.

In the dissenting opinion for Press Publishing Company v. Monroe, it was argued that the court majority had erred in its interpretation of libel law and its application to this case. The dissent emphasized that truth should be an absolute defense against charges of libel, a principle which they believed was not upheld by the majority's decision. They contended that if a published statement is true, no matter how damaging or offensive it may be perceived, it cannot constitute as defamation under U.S law. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's view on malice; arguing that even if malicious intent could be proven in publishing truthful information about someone else’s private life without their consent - such action does not necessarily amount to defamation unless false information is involved or there is some form of misrepresentation. Therefore, according to them any harm caused by such publications should rather fall within privacy laws than being treated as defamatory per se.