Preston v. Manard & Another was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court could issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in federal custody. The case arose when the petitioner, Preston, was arrested in the state of Louisiana and charged with a federal crime. He was then taken into federal custody and held in a federal prison. Preston then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court, arguing that he was being unlawfully detained. The state court granted the writ and ordered Preston to be released from federal custody. The federal government then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner in federal custody. The Supreme Court agreed with the federal government, holding that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to detain a prisoner.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Preston v. Manard & Another, arguing that the majority had misinterpreted a Louisiana statute and failed to consider its full context. He argued that while it was true that under Louisiana law, an executor or administrator of an estate could not be held liable for debts incurred by his predecessor, this did not mean they were absolved from all responsibility for such debts. Rather, he argued that if there was evidence of fraud or negligence on behalf of either party involved in incurring the debt then liability would still apply and should have been considered by the court. Furthermore, Justice Field noted how even though both parties may have acted with good faith when entering into their agreement regarding payment terms for a loan taken out against property owned by Manard's deceased father-in-law (the subject matter at hand), this did not necessarily preclude them from being held liable if any fraudulent activity occurred during said transaction as well as subsequent ones involving other creditors who also sought repayment from Manard's estate after his death. Ultimately Justice Field concluded that since there was no clear proof one way or another whether fraud had indeed taken place within these transactions - which would ultimately determine whether Preston could collect on her claim against Manard’s estate - it should be left up to a jury to decide based upon all available evidence presented before them in order to reach a fair verdict concerning liability between both parties involved