In the 1922 case of Price Fire & Water Proofing Company v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving a government contract for construction work at Fort Sam Houston in Texas. The Price Fire & Water Proofing Company had been awarded this contract and subsequently completed the work as specified. However, they later claimed that there were additional costs incurred due to changes made by the government during construction which were not covered under their original bid. They sought compensation from the federal government for these extra expenses but were denied by both lower courts and then appealed to the Supreme Court. The key issue was whether or not these additional costs should be considered part of their contractual obligation or if they constituted an unforeseen expense that warranted further payment from the U.S Government. The court ultimately sided with previous rulings stating that any alterations made during construction fell within what could reasonably be expected in such projects and thus did not warrant extra compensation beyond what was agreed upon in initial contracts. This decision reinforced principles regarding governmental immunity against claims unless it has expressly consented to them, as well as setting precedents about how contractors must handle unexpected changes when working on public projects.

In the dissenting opinion for Price Fire & Water Proofing Company v. United States, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold a conviction based on an indictment which did not specify any particular act of fraud was erroneous. The dissent contended that this lack of specificity violated the defendant’s constitutional rights by failing to provide them with adequate notice of what they were being accused of and preventing them from preparing an effective defense. Furthermore, it was suggested that such a broad interpretation could potentially criminalize innocent conduct if it happened to fall within the vaguely defined parameters set out in the indictment. Therefore, according to this view, upholding such a conviction would be inconsistent with principles of justice and fairness as well as established legal precedent requiring indictments for fraud offenses to clearly state specific fraudulent acts.