Price v. Kelley was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when the petitioner, Price, was convicted of a federal crime and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a federal prison. Price then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a state court, arguing that his conviction was unconstitutional. The state court granted the writ and ordered Price to be released from federal custody. The United States Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus is a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison a person convicted of a federal crime. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy that is available only to those who are in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. Since Price was in custody pursuant to a valid federal conviction, the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ. The Court's decision in Price v. Kelley established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners who are being held in federal custody. The decision also reaffirmed the principle that the writ of habeas corpus is a federal remedy that is available only to those who are in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Justice Harlan delivered the dissenting opinion in Price v. Kelley, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an absurd result. He argued that under prior decisions of the Supreme Court, a state could not be held liable for damages caused by its officers when they acted beyond their authority or outside of their official capacity. In this case, he argued that it had been clearly established at trial that Kelley had exceeded his authority as a deputy sheriff and thus should not have been indemnified by the state. Furthermore, Justice Harlan noted that if states were allowed to indemnify officers who acted beyond their authority then there would be no incentive for them to act within it; such an outcome was unacceptable according to him because it undermined public confidence in law enforcement officials and encouraged disregard for legal limits on power. Finally, Justice Harlan concluded his dissent with a warning about what might happen if states were allowed too much leeway in shielding themselves from liability: "The tendency is obvious toward making government irresponsible."