Pulsifer v. United States

Questions presented

SCOTUS records, cert granted 27 Feb 2023

The "safety valve" provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Congress amended the first set of criteria, in§ 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he "does not have-(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added). The question presented is whether the "and" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means "and," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the "and" means "or," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3- point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold).

Opinion summary

Etalia.ai summary of the majority opinion

The case involves the interpretation of a provision in the First Step Act, which allows certain nonviolent drug offenders to receive reduced sentences. The Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether individuals who have prior convictions for serious offenses are eligible for sentence reductions under this act. The petitioner argued that their previous conviction should not disqualify them from receiving leniency because it did not involve violence or significant criminal history as defined by the statute. The government contended that any prior serious offense automatically excludes an individual from eligibility, regardless of its nature or context. Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of a broader interpretation allowing more flexibility and discretion for judges when considering past convictions within sentencing decisions under the First Step Act.