This case was heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1884. The case involved a dispute between the Quebec Bank of Toronto and Hellman, the assignee of a bankrupt debtor. The debtor had given the bank a promissory note for $2,000, which was secured by a mortgage on real estate. The bank sued Hellman for the debt, but Hellman argued that the debt was discharged in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court held that the debt was not discharged in bankruptcy. The Court reasoned that the debt was secured by a mortgage on real estate, and that the mortgage was not discharged in bankruptcy. The Court noted that the debtor had not surrendered the mortgaged property to the assignee, and that the assignee had not taken any steps to foreclose the mortgage. Therefore, the Court held that the debt was not discharged in bankruptcy, and the bank was entitled to recover the debt from Hellman.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Quebec Bank of Toronto v. Hellman, Assignee, arguing that the majority’s decision was too narrow and failed to consider all relevant facts. He argued that a contract between two parties should be interpreted as written and not changed by courts unless it is ambiguous or incomplete. In this case, he noted that there were no ambiguities in the contract language; thus, any changes made by the court would alter its meaning and violate established principles of law. Furthermore, Justice Field argued that if one party had intended for their agreement to include certain terms but neglected to include them in writing then they should have done so before signing it. He also stated that when interpreting contracts courts must look at both parties’ intentions rather than just one side's interpretation of what was agreed upon since both sides are equally bound by its terms regardless of who drafted it initially. Finally, Justice Field concluded his dissent with an admonishment against allowing judges to make decisions based on their own personal views instead of following established legal precedent when deciding cases such as this one where clear contractual language exists without ambiguity or incompleteness