In the case of Railroad Company v. Richmond, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a railroad company had the right to build a bridge over a navigable river in the state of Virginia. The railroad company argued that it had the right to build the bridge under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, which gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. The state of Virginia argued that the bridge would interfere with navigation on the river and thus should not be allowed. The Supreme Court held that the railroad company did have the right to build the bridge. The Court reasoned that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, and that the bridge was necessary for the railroad company to engage in interstate commerce. The Court also noted that the bridge would not interfere with navigation on the river, and thus the state of Virginia could not prevent the railroad company from building the bridge. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the railroad company had the right to build the bridge over the navigable river in the state of Virginia. The Court reasoned that the bridge was necessary for the railroad company to engage in interstate commerce, and that it would not interfere with navigation on the river.

In the case of Railroad Company v. Richmond, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the city of Richmond had not violated any constitutional provision by enacting an ordinance requiring railroad companies to fence their tracks within its limits. He noted that while Congress has exclusive power over interstate commerce, it does not have authority to interfere with local regulations concerning matters such as fencing and other safety measures for railroads operating within state boundaries. Furthermore, Justice Field asserted that since there was no federal law prohibiting states from regulating railroads in this manner, then Virginia's statute allowing cities like Richmond to do so should be upheld. In conclusion, he concluded that if Congress wanted to prevent states from passing laws like these then they would need to pass legislation specifically addressing them instead of relying on general provisions regarding interstate commerce.