Ray v. Smith was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, John Ray, was held in a federal prison in the state of Missouri. Ray sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a prisoner's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the prisoner's confinement. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Ray v. Smith, arguing that the majority had failed to consider a crucial point of law. He argued that under the Constitution and laws of Arkansas, an executor was not liable for debts incurred by his testator prior to their appointment as executor. The majority opinion had held otherwise, finding that an executor could be held liable for such debts if they were unpaid at the time of death or when he took office as executor. Justice Field disagreed with this interpretation and argued instead that it would be unjust to hold an individual responsible for another's debt without any fault on their part; thus, he concluded that no liability should attach unless there was some act done by them which constituted negligence or bad faith in relation to those obligations.