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In Reed et al. v. Ross, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in 1983 that a federal habeas corpus petitioner is not barred from asserting constitutional claims which were not raised on direct appeal if he can show cause for his failure to raise these issues and actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which he complains. The case involved respondent Ross who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in North Carolina state court. He did not challenge the constitutionality of jury instructions at trial or on direct review but later sought federal habeas relief claiming those instructions violated due process rights under Sandstrom v Montana (1979). The District Court dismissed his petition as procedurally defaulted but Fourth Circuit reversed this decision stating that it would be fundamentally unfair to require him to have anticipated a specific ruling by the Supreme Court before it had been made.
In the dissenting opinion for Reed et al. v. Ross, Justice O'Connor argued that the majority's decision to allow a federal habeas corpus petitioner to claim ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to anticipate changes in constitutional law was misguided and would lead to an increase in frivolous claims. She contended that this ruling essentially penalizes defense attorneys for not predicting future developments in legal doctrine, which is unreasonable and unfair. Furthermore, she expressed concern about the potential implications of such a precedent on judicial efficiency as it could inundate courts with meritless petitions from prisoners claiming their lawyers were ineffective because they did not foresee shifts in constitutional interpretation or application.