Reedy v. Scott was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Reedy, was held in a federal prison in the state of Virginia. Reedy sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the detention. The Court's decision in Reedy v. Scott established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and has been used to support the principle that state courts cannot interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Reedy v. Scott, a case involving an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas concerning title to land. Justice Field argued that under Arkansas law, when two persons claim title to land and one has possession while the other has legal title, then equity will not interfere with such possession until it is established that there was fraud or mistake in obtaining it. In this case, however, he believed that equity should have interfered because there were facts which showed fraud on behalf of those claiming possession as well as evidence showing mistake by those who had obtained legal title. He further argued that since both parties had some right to the property at issue and neither could be said to have exclusive rights over it without interference from equity courts should intervene so justice can be done between them. Ultimately he concluded his dissent by stating “that where two persons are found each having some colorable right or interest in lands claimed by both…equity ought not only interpose its aid but also take into consideration all matters necessary for doing complete justice between them”