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This case involved the executors of Frederick Notrebe, deceased, Mary F. Notrebe (widow) and Edward C. Morton and his wife Mary F. Morton (heirs). They appealed against William W. Woodfolk who was a creditor of Frederick's estate for an amount exceeding $10,000 which he had loaned to him prior to his death in 1854 without receiving any security or interest on the debt from him during his lifetime. The appellants argued that since there was no evidence that this debt had been secured by mortgage or other means at the time it was made, it should not be allowed as part of their claim against the estate because such debts were prohibited under Maryland law at that time unless they were secured by some form of collateral agreement between both parties before being incurred. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Woodfolk stating that although there may have been no formal agreement between them regarding security for repayment when this debt was initially taken out; nevertheless due to its large size and long duration over several years leading up to Notrebe’s death; it could reasonably be assumed that some sort of understanding existed between them concerning its payment even if nothing specific had ever been written down about it beforehand
In this case, the appellants argued that a deed of trust executed by Frederick Notrebe in 1844 should be enforced. The deed stated that if Notrebe died without any children or grandchildren, his estate would go to Mary F. Notrabe (his widow) and Edward C. Morton and his wife Mary F. Morton (his heirs). However, William W Woodfolk claimed he was entitled to part of the estate under an earlier will from 1840 which had been revoked by a later will in 1845 but not probated until after Notrebe's death in 1858. The majority opinion held that since the 1840 will had been revoked before it could be probated, it did not have legal effect and therefore Woodfolk was not entitled to any portion of the estate; however Justice Grier dissented on this point arguing instead that since there were no other wills between 1840-1845 when revocation occurred, then according to Virginia law at the time Woodfolk should still receive some portion of the estate as provided for in the original 1840 will even though it had technically been revoked prior to being probated.