In Relief Fire Insurance Company of New York v. Shaw, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to determine whether a fire insurance policy was valid and enforceable. The plaintiff, Relief Fire Insurance Company of New York, had issued a policy to the defendant, Shaw, for the protection of his property against fire. The policy contained a clause that stated that the policy was void if the insured failed to pay the premium when due. Shaw failed to pay the premium when due, and the company refused to pay the claim when the property was destroyed by fire. The Supreme Court held that the policy was valid and enforceable. The Court noted that the policy was clear and unambiguous, and that the clause requiring payment of the premium was a valid condition of the policy. The Court also noted that the clause was not unconscionable or oppressive, and that the insured had been given reasonable notice of the condition. The Court concluded that the policy was valid and enforceable, and that the company was not obligated to pay the claim.

In Relief Fire Insurance Company of New York v. Shaw, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a fire insurance policy issued by the plaintiff company covered losses caused by an explosion in a building owned and occupied by the defendant. The majority opinion held that it did not, as explosions were excluded from coverage under the terms of the policy. Justice Field dissented on this point, arguing that while there may have been some evidence suggesting an explosion had occurred in this case, there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt that such an event had taken place; therefore, he argued that any ambiguity should be interpreted against the insurer and in favor of providing coverage for damages resulting from whatever cause they arose. He further noted that even if it could be proven conclusively that an explosion had occurred at Shaw's property prior to his obtaining insurance with Relief Fire Insurance Company of New York, then their exclusion clause would still not apply since it only applied to events occurring after issuance of said policy. As such, Justice Field concluded his dissent with a call for judgment in favor of Shaw based on these grounds alone