Reynolds & Another v. Iron Silver Mining Company is a United States Supreme Court case that was decided in 1886. The case involved a dispute between the Iron Silver Mining Company and two of its shareholders, Reynolds and another. The shareholders had brought suit against the company, alleging that the company had failed to pay dividends on their shares. The company argued that the shareholders had no right to the dividends because they had not paid the full amount of their subscription to the company. The Supreme Court held that the shareholders were entitled to the dividends, regardless of whether they had paid the full amount of their subscription. The Court reasoned that the shareholders had a right to the dividends because they had paid a portion of their subscription and had received the benefit of the company's operations. The Court also held that the company was not entitled to withhold the dividends until the shareholders had paid the full amount of their subscription. The Court's decision in this case established that shareholders are entitled to dividends, even if they have not paid the full amount of their subscription. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases and has become an important precedent in corporate law.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Reynolds & Another v. Iron Silver Mining Company, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established law and precedent. He argued that under existing laws, a mining company had no right to enter upon private land for mineral exploration without first obtaining permission from the owner of said land or paying compensation for any damage caused by such entry. Furthermore, he noted that while Congress may have granted certain rights to mining companies with respect to public lands, it did not grant them similar rights on private lands; thus, allowing a mining company access onto someone else's property without their consent would be an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law. Justice Field concluded his dissent by noting that if Congress wished to grant such privileges then they should do so explicitly rather than relying on judicial interpretation which could lead to confusion and uncertainty in future cases involving similar issues.