In the case of Rhode Island v. Innis, decided in 1979, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a suspect's right to counsel and protection against self-incrimination under Miranda rights were not violated when police officers had a conversation among themselves within earshot of the suspect about their concern for disabled children who might find an undiscovered shotgun. The defendant, Thomas J. Innis, was arrested and read his Miranda rights but did not explicitly invoke them before being transported by three officers to police headquarters. During this journey, he overheard their conversation and subsequently led them to the hidden weapon used in a robbery-murder crime he was suspected of committing. The court held that since there was no direct questioning or its functional equivalent from law enforcement officials which could be considered "interrogation", there wasn't any violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination nor Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

In the dissenting opinion for Rhode Island v. Innis, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, argued that the majority's decision was a departure from Miranda v. Arizona (1966). They contended that any police conduct intentionally designed to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect should be considered as interrogation under Miranda rules. The dissenters believed that the conversation between officers in front of Innis about finding a shotgun near a school constituted such conduct because it was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response given his concern for disabled children expressed earlier during his arrest. Therefore, they asserted this violated his Fifth Amendment rights since he had not been re-Mirandized before this indirect questioning began. Furthermore, they criticized the majority's narrow definition of 'interrogation,' arguing it undermined protections against self-incrimination and would lead to confusion in future cases regarding what constitutes custodial interrogation.