In Richards v. Mackall, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The petitioner, Richards, was a prisoner in the custody of the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia. He had been convicted of a crime in the District of Columbia and was serving a sentence in the federal penitentiary. He sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, claiming that his conviction was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus was a power reserved to the federal government, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison a person convicted of a federal crime. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy available only to those who were unlawfully detained, and that Richards had been lawfully convicted and sentenced. The Court concluded that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in federal custody, and that Richards' petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be denied.

In the case of Richards v. Mackall, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a certain deed from one party to another was valid and enforceable. The majority opinion held that it was not, but Justice Field dissented on the grounds that there were sufficient facts in evidence for a jury to decide if the deed should be enforced or not. He argued that since there had been no fraud or mistake alleged by either party, and since both parties had acted in good faith with full knowledge of all relevant facts at hand, then it would have been appropriate for a jury trial to take place so as to properly weigh all available evidence before making any determination about validity of said deed. Furthermore, he noted that even though some technicalities may have existed which could potentially invalidate such an agreement under common law principles (such as lack of consideration), these issues should still be left up for juries rather than courts deciding them based solely on legal precedent without taking into account any additional context surrounding each particular case.