In the case of Richardson, Warden v. Marsh (1986), the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was not violated when testimony from an accomplice implicating her in a murder was admitted into evidence, even though she did not have an opportunity to cross-examine him about it. The court held that as long as jurors were instructed they could only consider this testimony for limited purposes and there was no overwhelming probability they would use it improperly against the defendant, then its admission did not violate her rights. In this case, Regina Marsh had been convicted of first-degree murder based partly on statements made by another participant in the crime who refused to testify at trial due to his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

In the dissenting opinion for Richardson, Warden v. Marsh (1986), Justice Stevens argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings regarding a defendant's right to a fair trial. He contended that by allowing testimony about an accomplice’s confession implicating the defendant in front of jurors who were later instructed to disregard it, violated her Sixth Amendment rights. The justice believed this approach assumed an unrealistic level of sophistication and self-discipline from average jurors. He also pointed out inconsistencies within the court's own logic; if such instructions could be trusted, then there would be no need for rules excluding certain evidence from trials altogether. Furthermore, he criticized their reliance on harmless-error analysis as inappropriate given its potential impact on fundamental constitutional rights.