In the case of Richmond v. Iron, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state could impose a tax on a foreign corporation that was doing business within its borders. The case involved the Iron Mining and Manufacturing Company, a foreign corporation that was operating a mine in the state of Virginia. The state of Virginia had imposed a tax on the company, and the company challenged the tax in court. The Supreme Court held that the state of Virginia had the right to impose the tax on the foreign corporation. The Court reasoned that the state had the power to tax any business that was operating within its borders, regardless of whether the business was foreign or domestic. The Court also noted that the tax was not discriminatory, as it was applied equally to all businesses operating within the state. The Court's decision in Richmond v. Iron established that states have the right to impose taxes on foreign corporations that are doing business within their borders. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and it has been used to support the idea that states have the right to tax foreign corporations that are doing business within their borders.

In the case of Richmond v. Iron, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. He believed that Congress had not intended to grant exclusive rights to patent holders when it passed the Patent Act of 1836, as this would have been an unconstitutional taking without just compensation. Furthermore, he argued that even if Congress did intend for such exclusivity to exist, it could only do so by explicitly stating its intention in clear language within the statute itself; otherwise any implied intent would be invalidated due to constitutional concerns. Finally, Justice Field noted that while there may have been some evidence suggesting congressional intent for exclusive patent rights at one point in time (prior to passage of the act), this was no longer true after passage and thus could not serve as justification for granting such privileges now.