In the case of Ristaino et al. v. Ross, 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a trial judge was not constitutionally required to question potential jurors about racial prejudice during jury selection in every case involving a black defendant and white victims. The court held that such questioning is only mandated when racial issues are "inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial." In this particular case, Robert Lee Ross, an African-American man convicted for armed robbery by an all-white jury in Massachusetts state court had appealed his conviction on grounds that he was denied equal protection because prospective jurors were not questioned regarding possible racial bias during voir dire (jury selection). However, since race wasn't central to this specific crime or its prosecution - it involved no charges of racially motivated behavior nor any contentious racial elements - there was no constitutional requirement for inquiry into potential juror bias.

In the dissenting opinion for Ristaino v. Ross, Justice Marshall argued that the majority's decision failed to adequately protect a defendant's right to an impartial jury. He contended that racial issues were clearly present in this case involving a black defendant and white victims, thus requiring specific questioning about potential racial bias during jury selection. The majority’s reliance on Aldridge was misplaced according to him because it did not consider whether race was “inextricably bound up with” the facts of the crime itself but rather focused on community sentiment towards race relations at large. Furthermore, he criticized their narrow interpretation of Ham v. South Carolina which required voir dire questions about racial prejudice only when racial issues are overtly involved in a case as overly restrictive and contrary to precedent set by prior cases like Swain v Alabama where broader interpretations were applied regarding juror biases beyond just race-related ones.