In the case of Robert E. Gibson v. Florida Bar, et al., 1991, Gibson challenged the constitutionality of a rule enforced by The Florida Bar that prohibited attorneys from soliciting professional employment within thirty days following an accident or disaster. He argued that this rule violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and commercial expression. However, the Supreme Court upheld the regulation as constitutional in a per curiam decision (a ruling issued in the name of the court rather than specific judges). The court found that there was substantial government interest in protecting victims from invasive conduct during vulnerable times and maintaining public confidence in legal profession's integrity which justified limiting attorney solicitations immediately after accidents or disasters.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Robert E. Gibson v. Florida Bar, et al., argued that the majority's decision to uphold a ban on direct-mail solicitation by lawyers was an infringement upon First Amendment rights. The dissenters believed that such a blanket prohibition could not be justified under Central Hudson's four-part test for commercial speech regulation, which requires that restrictions directly advance substantial government interests and are no more extensive than necessary to serve those interests. They contended that while protecting citizens from fraud or undue influence is indeed a significant interest, there were less restrictive means available to achieve this goal without infringing upon free speech rights - such as enforcing rules against deceptive practices or requiring disclaimers in mailings. Furthermore, they pointed out inconsistencies in allowing other forms of lawyer advertising but banning direct-mail solicitations specifically.