Term: 2011
Docket: 10-1399
Dana Roberts, Petitioner v. Sea-land Services, Inc., Et Al.
- Pro
10-1399 ROBERTS V. SEA-LAND SERVICES DECISION BELOW: 625 F.3d 1204 LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION CERT. GRANTED 9/27/2011 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 ("Longshore Act") provides generally for compensation for total disability in periodic payments at a rate of two-thirds of the "average weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of the injury," and for most partial disabilities the same fraction of the difference between that weekly wage and the worker's residual "wage-earning capacity." Id. §§ 8-10, 33 U.S.C. §§ 908-10. But it has always imposed upper and lower limits on the rate payable as so determined. Section 6(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 906(b), provides that the compensation rate cannot be more than twice "the applicable national average weekly wage," as determined for each fiscal year; nor can compensation for total disability be less than the lesser of half the "applicable national average weekly wage" so determined and the worker's full pre-injury earnings. The question which fiscal year's limits are the "applicable" ones is addressed by § 6 (c): Determinations under subsection (b)(3) of this section with respect to a [fiscal year] shall apply to employees or survivors currently receiving compensation for permanent total disability or death benefits during such period, as well as those newly awarded compensation during such period. 33 U.S.C. § 906(c). The identity of the years whose limits are "applicable" under this provision has divided the two courts of appeals with the heaviest Longshore Act dockets. The questions presented are simple and straightforward: 1. Whether the phrase "those newly awarded compensation during such period" in Longshore Act § 6(c), applicable to all classes of disability except permanent total, can be read to mean "those first entitled to compensation during such period," regard-less of when it is awarded. 2. Whether the phrase "employees or survivors currently receiving compensation for permanent total disability or death benefits during such period" in § 6(c) can likewise be read to mean those "entitled to [such] compensation during such period," without reference to when it is received. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 08-70268
In the case of Dana Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., et al., 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with interpreting a provision of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). The petitioner, Dana Roberts, had suffered an injury while working for Sea-Land Services in 2002 which left him disabled. He received compensation under LHWCA but disputed the amount he was awarded based on his interpretation of how his average weekly wage should be calculated according to Section 906(c) of LHWCA. The court ruled in favor of Sea-Land Services and held that "the term 'currently receiving compensation for permanent total disability' refers to persons already awarded compensation when they reach maximum medical improvement." Therefore, it concluded that Mr. Roberts's benefits were correctly calculated based on national average weekly wages at the time he reached maximum medical improvement rather than when he got injured or stopped working due to injury.
In the dissenting opinion for Dana Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "newly awarded compensation" in Section 6(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). She argued that this phrase should refer to when an employee first becomes entitled to disability benefits rather than when a formal compensation order is issued. This would mean that workers who are injured but continue working while their claims are processed wouldn't be disadvantaged by receiving lower maximum benefits due to delays in issuing official orders. Furthermore, she pointed out inconsistencies in applying different interpretations of "awarded" within the same statute and highlighted potential unfairness resulting from such discrepancies. Therefore, she believed that Congress intended for all disabled employees under LHWCA to have equal access to annual adjustments regardless of whether they received voluntary payments or had delayed formal awards.
