Robertson v. Rosenthal was a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1933. The case involved a dispute between two parties over a contract for the sale of a house. The plaintiff, Robertson, had entered into a contract with the defendant, Rosenthal, to purchase a house. Robertson paid a deposit and was to pay the balance of the purchase price at a later date. However, Rosenthal refused to complete the sale and Robertson sued for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that the contract was valid and enforceable. The Court found that the contract was supported by consideration and that the parties had a meeting of the minds. The Court also held that the contract was not voidable due to any lack of capacity or fraud. The Court further held that the contract was not voidable due to any lack of capacity or fraud. The Court also held that Robertson was entitled to damages for the breach of contract. The Court awarded Robertson the amount of the deposit plus interest, as well as damages for the loss of the benefit of the bargain. The Court also held that Rosenthal was liable for attorney's fees and costs. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that Robertson was entitled to damages for the breach of contract and that Rosenthal was liable for attorney's fees and costs. The Court also held that the contract was valid and enforceable.

In the dissenting opinion for Robertson v. Rosenthal, Justice Traynor argued that California's usury law was not preempted by federal banking regulations and should be enforced in this case. He noted that while the National Bank Act did provide some exemptions from state usury laws, it did not apply to all banks or transactions and thus could not be used as a blanket exemption from such laws. Furthermore, he argued that Congress had never intended to completely displace state regulation of interest rates when passing the National Bank Act and therefore states still retained their authority over such matters. As a result, Justice Traynor concluded that California's usury law should have been applied in this case since there was no evidence of any congressional intent to override it with respect to national banks operating within its borders.