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In the case of Robertson v. Wegmann, 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether a civil rights claim under federal law could survive the death of both parties involved in Louisiana state court. The plaintiff had filed a lawsuit alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by several New Orleans officials and attorneys who conspired to have him disbarred from practicing law due to his representation of clients associated with organized crime. After he passed away during litigation, his executor sought to continue pursuing these claims on behalf of his estate. The defendants argued that according to Louisiana's survival statute, such actions abate upon death unless they involve property damage or physical injury - which this case did not. The District Court agreed and dismissed the suit; however, this decision was reversed by an appellate court. Upon reaching the Supreme Court though, it ruled in favor of the defendants stating that while federal laws should be applied broadly for civil rights cases as per Section 1988 (which allows courts to use state laws when necessary), there is no indication Congress intended for all aspects related to survival and wrongful-death actions under every circumstance would fall within its purview.
In the dissenting opinion for Robertson v. Wegmann, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the majority's interpretation of Section 1988 was too narrow and failed to fully consider Congress' intent. He believed that Congress intended to provide a broad remedy for civil rights violations, which should include allowing a cause of action to survive even after the death of either party involved in the lawsuit. According to him, this would better serve public interest by deterring future civil rights abuses and providing compensation for victims’ families or estates. Furthermore, he disagreed with applying Louisiana’s survival law because it contradicted federal interests in enforcing civil rights laws; instead, he suggested using common law principles as an alternative approach when state laws are inadequate or inconsistent with federal objectives.