In Robison v. Female Orphan Asylum of Portland, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a charitable trust created by a will was valid. The trust was created by the will of a deceased woman, who had left her estate to the Female Orphan Asylum of Portland, Oregon. The trust was to be used to provide an education for the orphans of the Asylum. The Supreme Court held that the trust was valid and enforceable. The Court noted that the trust was created for a charitable purpose, and that the trust was not contrary to public policy. The Court also noted that the trust was created for the benefit of the orphans, and that the trust was not contrary to the will of the deceased woman. The Court also held that the trust was not invalid because the Asylum was not a corporation. The Court noted that the Asylum was a voluntary association, and that the trust was valid even though the Asylum was not a corporation. The Court also held that the trust was not invalid because the Asylum was not a charitable institution. The Court noted that the trust was created for a charitable purpose, and that the trust was not contrary to public policy. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the trust was valid and enforceable. The Court noted that the trust was created for a charitable purpose, and that the trust was not contrary to public policy. The Court also held that the trust was not invalid because the Asylum was not a corporation or a charitable institution.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Robison v. Female Orphan Asylum of Portland, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He argued that a contract between two parties should be enforced as written unless there is evidence of fraud or mistake, which he did not believe existed in this case. The contract at issue provided for payment by installment over time with interest on any unpaid balance due after six months from date of maturity; however, the majority held that such language could not be enforced because it violated public policy against usury laws. Justice Field disagreed with this interpretation and noted that if contracts are allowed to be voided based on public policy considerations then no one can rely upon them when entering into agreements since they may later be found unenforceable due to changing social mores or values. He concluded his dissent by noting that while usury laws were important and necessary protections for individuals who enter into loan agreements, they should only apply where specifically stated within a contract rather than being imposed through judicial fiat without regard for its terms.