In the 1997 case of George G. Rogers v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled on whether a defendant's false statement to a grand jury could be considered perjury if it was literally true but misleading. The court held that under federal law, such statements cannot constitute perjury because they are not technically false. This decision upheld an earlier ruling in Bronston v. United States (1973), which established that only unambiguously false testimony can form the basis for a perjury conviction. Rogers had been indicted for making two allegedly perjurious statements during his grand jury testimony regarding his involvement in drug trafficking activities and money laundering schemes with Colombian drug cartels. The Supreme Court reversed Rogers' conviction by applying what is known as "the literal truth defense", stating that even though his answers were designed to mislead investigators, they were not factually incorrect or untrue; hence he did not commit perjury.

In the dissenting opinion for George G. Rogers v. United States, Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority's decision to uphold Rogers' conviction was incorrect because it failed to consider whether or not he had knowingly and intentionally lied under oath during his bankruptcy proceedings. She pointed out that while Rogers may have given false information, there was no clear evidence indicating he did so with fraudulent intent - a necessary component of perjury as defined by federal law. Furthermore, she criticized the jury instructions provided in this case which allowed for a guilty verdict even if jurors believed Rogers made his statements based on an honest mistake or misunderstanding rather than deliberate deceitfulness. In her view, these flawed instructions could potentially lead to wrongful convictions of individuals who are merely mistaken about certain facts rather than intentionally lying under oath.