Term: 2017
Docket: 16-534
Rubin v. Islamic Republic Of Iran
- Pro
16-534 RUBIN V. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN DECISION BELOW: 830 F.3d 470 LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 14-1935 GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 6/27/2017 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. Under the original execution immunity provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, et seq. (the "FSIA"), plaintiffs holding terrorism judgments against designated state sponsors of terrorism "faced practical and legal difficulties at the enforcement stage." Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1317-18 (2016). "[O]nly foreign-state property located in the United States and 'used for a commercial activity' was available for the satisfaction of judgments." Id. at 1318. In 2008, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) to expand the availability of assets for postjudgment execution against the property of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, their agencies and instrumentalities. Id. at 1318 n.2. The Seventh Circuit held below that section 1610(g) merely amends the existing attachment immunity provisions to enable terrorism judgment creditors to enforce their judgments against the foreign governments' instrumentalities that have been established as separate juridical entities. This holding conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2016), which held that section 1610(g) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception, which in addition to enabling veil piercing, allows terrorism victims to attach and execute upon any assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, their agencies, or instrumentalities regardless of whether the assets are connected to commercial activity in the United States.(1) The first question presented for review is: Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terror victim judgment creditors to attach and execute upon assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism regardless of whether the assets are otherwise subject to execution under section 1610. 2. Section 1610(a) is another execution immunity provision of the FSIA. It enables execution upon "property in the United States of a foreign state ... used for a commercial activity in the United States" under certain specified conditions enumerated in the statute. The statutory text refers to the commercial use without respect to any particular actor. The second question presented for review is: Whether the commercial use exception to execution immunity, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a), applies to a foreign sovereign's property located in the United States only when the property is used by the foreign state itself. (1) Iran has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the Ninth Circuit's Bennett decision based upon the conflict with the Seventh Circuit's decision below as to the construction of section 1610(g). See Supreme Court Case No. 16-334.
The case Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2017 revolved around the issue of whether victims of terrorism could seize Iranian artifacts held in a Chicago museum to satisfy a $71.5 million judgment against Iran. The plaintiffs were American citizens who had been injured or were survivors of those killed in a 1997 suicide bombing in Jerusalem carried out by Hamas, which they alleged was supported by Iran. They won their lawsuit but struggled to collect the damages as most Iranian assets are shielded from seizure under U.S law due to sovereign immunity exceptions for foreign nations' property present within the country's jurisdiction. However, plaintiffs argued that an exception applied because these assets were being used for commercial activity and thus should be available for seizure towards satisfying their judgment debt. The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with this argument stating that only properties used explicitly for commercial activities can be seized under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and not merely because they are involved in some form of commerce like loaning artifacts to museums.
In the dissenting opinion for Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer, argued that the majority misinterpreted both the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and Congress' intent in passing it. They contended that FSIA should be read to allow victims of state-sponsored terrorism to seize certain foreign states’ property located in the United States as compensation for their injuries. The dissenters believed that this interpretation was more consistent with Congress's clear intention when enacting FSIA - to provide meaningful remedies for victims of terrorist acts committed by designated states like Iran while respecting international law principles governing sovereign immunity.
