In the case of Russel et al. v. The Trustees of Transylvania University, a dispute arose between two parties over an agreement to purchase land from the university trustees for $2,000 in Kentucky currency. The plaintiffs argued that they had fulfilled their part of the bargain by paying the full amount and were entitled to receive title deeds for the property; however, due to inflationary pressures caused by war-time economic conditions, this sum was worth less than when it was originally agreed upon. In response, defendants claimed that since no specific form or denomination of money had been specified in their contract with plaintiffs, they could not be held liable for any losses incurred as a result of devaluation during wartime. After considering both sides’ arguments and examining relevant legal precedents on contracts involving payment in currency subject to depreciation due to changing market forces beyond either party’s control, Supreme Court justices ruled unanimously against defendants and found them responsible for compensating plaintiffs according to terms set forth at time contract was made regardless of subsequent fluctuations in value or purchasing power resulting from external economic factors such as war-time inflation

In the case of Russel et al. v. The Trustees of Transylvania University, Chief Justice Marshall delivered a dissenting opinion that argued against the majority's decision to grant an injunction restraining the trustees from exercising their powers as granted by Kentucky law. He argued that it was not within the court’s power to interfere with state laws and regulations, particularly in this case where there had been no violation of any federal statute or constitutional provision. Furthermore, he noted that even if such interference were permissible under certain circumstances, those circumstances did not exist here since there was no evidence presented showing any harm done by allowing the trustees to exercise their authority as provided for in Kentucky law. In conclusion, Chief Justice Marshall believed that granting an injunction would be an unwarranted intrusion into matters which should remain within state jurisdiction and thus urged his colleagues on the bench to reject it accordingly.