The U.S. Supreme Court case Rutland Railroad Company v. Central Vermont Railroad Company in 1895 revolved around a dispute between two railroad companies over the use of tracks and facilities. The Rutland Railroad Company had leased certain rail lines from the Central Vermont Railroad for an agreed-upon annual rent, but later claimed that it was entitled to use additional tracks and facilities without any extra charge due to a clause in their lease agreement which allowed them access to "all necessary side-tracks." However, the Central Vermont Railway disagreed with this interpretation of the contract and demanded additional payment for using these resources beyond what was originally stipulated in their lease agreement. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Central Vermont Railway, stating that while contracts should be interpreted liberally, they cannot be stretched beyond their clear intent as expressed by both parties at signing time. Therefore, since there were no explicit provisions allowing free usage of extra resources within the original contract signed by both parties, Rutland's claim was dismissed.

In the dissenting opinion for Rutland Railroad Company v. Central Vermont Railroad Company, Justice Brewer argued that the majority's decision to uphold a lower court ruling in favor of Central Vermont was incorrect because it failed to consider key aspects of contract law and property rights. He contended that when Rutland sold its rail line to Central Vermont, they did not transfer their right-of-way privileges over another company’s land as these were non-transferable without explicit consent from all parties involved. Therefore, he believed that Rutland should still have access rights over this third-party land despite selling their rail line. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's interpretation of an 1884 agreement between both companies which allowed them shared use of each other’s lines under certain conditions; according to him, this agreement did not automatically grant Central Vermont exclusive control over Rutland's former track after purchase since such a significant change would require clear and unambiguous language in the contract - something absent in this case.