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Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.

• 2013 • 571 U.S. 220 • Roberts Court
In the case of Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., 2013, a group of steelworkers sued their employer, U.S. Steel Corporation, for compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for time spent donning and doffing protective gear required for their jobs. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of U.S. Steel by interpreting "changing clothes" within Section 203(o) of FLSA to include putting on and taking off work-related protective gear. This interpretation allowed collective bargaining...Open Case
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Chief Roberts Court
Term: 2013
Docket: 12-417
571 U.S. 220
134 S. Ct. 870
187 L. Ed. 2d 729
2014 U.S. LEXIS 799
Argued: Nov 04, 2013

Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp.

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Questions presented:
SCOTUS Records

12-417 SANDIFER V. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. DECISION BELOW: 678 F.3d 590 LIMITED TO QUESTION 1. CERT. GRANTED 2/19/2013 QUESTION PRESENTED: Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the period of time during which a covered employee must be paid begins when the worker engages in a principal activity. Donning and doffing safety gear (including protective clothing) required by the employer is a principal activity when it is an integral and indispensable part of the activities for which the worker is employed. Such requirements are common in manufacturing firms. However, under section 203(o) of the Act an employer need not compensate a worker for time spent in "changing clothes" (even if it is a principal activity) if that time is expressly excluded from compensable time under a bona fide collective bargaining agreement applicable to that worker. The interrelated questions presented are: (1) What constitutes "changing clothes" within the meaning of section 203(o)? (2) If a worker's actions are a principal activity but fall within the scope of the section 203(o) exemption, do those actions nonetheless commence the period of time during which (aside from the clothes-changing time) the worker must be compensated? (3) If a worker engages in a principal activity which is not exempted by section 203(), but which involves only a de minimis amount of time, does the activity nonetheless commence the period of time during which the worker must be compensated? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 10-1821, 10-1866

Opinion Summary
AI Abstract

In the case of Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., 2013, a group of steelworkers sued their employer, U.S. Steel Corporation, for compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for time spent donning and doffing protective gear required for their jobs. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of U.S. Steel by interpreting "changing clothes" within Section 203(o) of FLSA to include putting on and taking off work-related protective gear. This interpretation allowed collective bargaining agreements to determine whether employees should be paid during this time or not; in this instance, it was agreed upon that they would not be compensated for such periods as per an agreement between U.S. Steel and its unionized workers' representatives.

Dissent Summary
AI Abstract

In the dissenting opinion for Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that the majority's interpretation of "changing clothes" under Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act was too broad. They contended that not all items worn on a person should be considered as clothing and thus disagreed with including protective gear in this definition. The dissenters believed that such an expansive interpretation could potentially exempt employers from compensating employees for time spent putting on and taking off various types of work-related protective equipment, which they viewed as contrary to Congress’s intent when it enacted FLSA. They also criticized the majority's approach to determining what constitutes a “principal activity,” arguing it would lead to arbitrary results.

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