In the case of Sandstrom v. Montana, David Sandstrom was convicted for "deliberate homicide" by a Montana court. The jury was instructed that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," which they applied to find Sandstrom guilty. However, he appealed on grounds that this instruction violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights as it shifted the burden of proof from prosecution to defense regarding intent - an essential element in proving guilt for deliberate homicide under state law. In 1979, the U.S Supreme Court agreed with him and reversed his conviction in a 7-2 decision stating that such instructions were indeed unconstitutional because they could be interpreted by jurors as either conclusive or shifting presumptions thus relieving prosecutors from their duty to prove every aspect of crime beyond reasonable doubt.

In the dissenting opinion for Sandstrom v. Montana, Justice Rehnquist argued that the jury instruction given by the trial court did not violate due process rights of defendant David Sandstrom. He contended that it was a permissible presumption and not an unconstitutional burden-shifting one as majority opined. The justice believed that this presumption merely assisted jurors in determining intent based on defendant's actions, which is often difficult to prove directly. Furthermore, he pointed out that such presumptions are commonly used in law and do not necessarily infringe upon a defendant's right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In his view, any potential confusion or misinterpretation by jurors could have been clarified through additional instructions rather than declaring it unconstitutional altogether.