In City of Savannah v. Kelly, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a city ordinance that prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages within the city limits was constitutional. The city of Savannah had passed the ordinance in 1881, and it was challenged by a local tavern owner, John Kelly. Kelly argued that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees the right to due process of law. He argued that the ordinance was too broad and that it deprived him of his right to pursue a lawful business. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the city of Savannah, finding that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city's police power. The Court held that the ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the city's authority to regulate the sale of alcohol within its borders. The Court also noted that the ordinance was not overly broad and did not deprive Kelly of his right to pursue a lawful business. The Court's decision in City of Savannah v. Kelly established that cities have the authority to regulate the sale of alcohol within their borders. The decision also established that such regulations must be reasonable and must not deprive individuals of their right to pursue a lawful business.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in City of Savannah v. Kelly, arguing that the majority's decision was an incorrect interpretation of Georgia law and should be reversed. He argued that under Georgia law, a city could not take private property for public use without just compensation being paid to the owner first. The majority had held that since there was no express provision in state statute requiring payment for such takings, it did not have to be done; however Justice Field disagreed with this reasoning and stated that if a taking occurred then compensation must still be paid regardless of whether or not it is explicitly required by statute. Furthermore he noted how other states had similar laws which all provided for some form of compensation when private property was taken by government entities and thus concluded that even though there may have been no explicit requirement in Georgia statutes at the time, they were still obligated to pay fair market value as part of any taking action they took against citizens' properties.