Term: 2003
Docket: 02-1657
Randall C. Scarborough v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary Of Veterans Affairs
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02-1657 SCARBOROUGH v. PRINCIPI Ruling below: CA Fed, 319 F.3d 1346 QUESTION PRESENTED In December 2001, in an earlier appeal in this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that an attorney's fee application under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), is jurisdictionally barred if the fee applicant does not allege, within the statute's 30-day limitations period, that the position of the United States lacked substantial justification, even when the application itself is timely filed and the applicant promptly amends the application to supply the allegation. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that its holding directly conflicted with decisions of other circuits. On June 17, 2002, this Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the Federal Circuit's decision, and remanded in light of Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 122 S. Ct. 1145 (2002). In a nearly verbatim reprise of its earlier ruling, the Federal Circuit again held the fee application jurisdictionally barred. That court again acknowledged the circuit split and then found Edelman inapposite. The question presented is the same as that presented in the earlier petition to this Court: Whether, or in what circumstances, an applicant for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act is barred from obtaining a fee award by the Act's 30-day statute of limitations solely because the applicant's timely-filed fee application did not initially allege that the position of the government in the underlying litigation lacked substantial justification. CERT. GRANTED: 9/30/03
In the case of Randall C. Scarborough v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs (2003), the U.S Supreme Court addressed whether a veteran who successfully challenged an administrative denial of benefits could be awarded attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The EAJA allows for such awards in civil actions brought by or against the United States unless "the position of the United States was substantially justified." The Department of Veterans Affairs had denied Mr. Scarborough's claim for disability benefits related to his military service in Vietnam, but he won on appeal before a federal court which found that there were errors in how his claim was evaluated initially. The issue at hand was whether this victory qualified him for attorney’s fees under EAJA even though it did not involve a final judgment on merits but rather remand orders directing further administrative proceedings where ultimate success remained uncertain. In its decision, the Supreme Court held that prevailing parties may recover fees incurred during both litigation and subsequent administrative proceedings if they achieve some degree of success on merits regardless if it is interim or incomplete relief.
In the dissenting opinion for Scarborough v. Principi, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) was incorrect and inconsistent with its plain language. He contended that the statute clearly requires a fee application to allege that it is timely and substantiated by an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing on behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and rate charged, which must be submitted within 30 days of final judgment in civil actions against United States agencies under this section. According to him, Scarborough’s claim did not meet these requirements as he failed to provide such an itemized statement within this timeframe; therefore his application should have been denied outright without consideration for equitable tolling principles applied by lower courts due to alleged extraordinary circumstances beyond his control preventing timely filing.
