Term: 2003
Docket: 03-526
Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department Of Corrections v. Warren Wesley Summerlin
- Pro
03-526 SCHRIRO v. SUMMERLIN Ruling below: CA 9, 341 F.3d 1082 QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW: In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002), this Court held that the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee extends to the determination of any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the maximum punishment for first-degree murder from life imprisonment to death. In the instant case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the rule announced in Ring should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. 1. Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring is substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality)? 2. Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague's exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings? 3. Did the Ninth Circuit err by applying Ring notwithstanding a "prior conviction" aggravating circumstance that, under Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998), need not be found by the jury? CERT. GRANTED: 12/1/03 Limited to questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition.
In the case of Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections v. Warren Wesley Summerlin (2003), the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a new rule for criminal procedure should not be applied retroactively to cases already final on direct review unless they meet one of two conditions: it is substantive or it is a "watershed rile of criminal procedure" implicating fundamental fairness and accuracy. The court held that Ring v. Arizona, which required juries rather than judges to find aggravating factors necessary for imposing death penalty did not apply retroactively under either condition because it was procedural and not a watershed rule as its impact on accuracy was minimal at best.
In the case of Schriro v. Summerlin, Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that Ring v. Arizona should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review because it constituted a "watershed rule" of criminal procedure under Teague v. Lane's framework for determining retroactivity. He contended that the majority opinion failed to properly apply this standard and misinterpreted precedent in reaching its conclusion. According to him, Ring fundamentally altered our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to fairness in capital sentencing by requiring jury determination of any fact necessary for imposition of death penalty rather than leaving it up to a judge alone - thus altering who makes critical decisions and how they are made during trials which he believes is fundamental enough change deserving retroactive application.
