Schwed v. Smith was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, John Schwed, was held in a federal prison in New York. Schwed filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a state court, arguing that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ and ordered Schwed's release. The federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal power, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect this right. The Court's decision in Schwed v. Smith established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and it remains an important precedent in the area of federal-state relations.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Schwed v. Smith, arguing that the majority had misconstrued both state and federal law when it held that a contract between two parties was unenforceable because of an alleged lack of consideration. He argued that under California law, which governed this case, there was no requirement for consideration to be given in order for a contract to be valid and enforceable. Furthermore, he noted that even if such a requirement did exist under state law, it would not apply in cases where one party has already performed their part of the agreement prior to any dispute arising over its validity or enforceability. In his view, since Schwed had already completed her part of the bargain by providing services as agreed upon with Smith before any questions were raised about whether she should receive payment or not; then she should have been entitled to recover damages from him regardless of whether there was sufficient consideration present at the time they entered into their agreement or not.