In Segrist v. Crabtree, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to compel a county auditor to issue a tax deed. The case arose when the plaintiff, Segrist, purchased a tract of land from the county auditor of Greene County, Ohio. The auditor refused to issue a tax deed for the property, claiming that the county had not received payment for the taxes due on the property. Segrist then filed a petition in the state court, asking for a writ of mandamus to compel the auditor to issue the deed. The state court granted the writ, and the auditor appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court had the authority to issue the writ of mandamus. The Court reasoned that the state court had the power to issue the writ because the auditor was a public officer, and the writ was necessary to compel him to perform his official duties. The Court also noted that the writ was necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff, who had purchased the property in good faith and was entitled to a tax deed. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the county auditor to issue a tax deed. The Court reasoned that the writ was necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff, who had purchased the property in good faith and was entitled to a tax deed.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Segrist v. Crabtree, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both law and justice. He argued that it was clear from the evidence presented at trial that there had been a valid contract between Segrist and Crabtree for the sale of land, which had been breached by Crabtree when he refused to pay for it as agreed upon. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that even if there were any doubts about whether or not a contract existed between them, those doubts should have been resolved in favor of Segrist since he was seeking specific performance rather than damages. He concluded his dissent by stating that "the judgment below should be affirmed."