In Seitz v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in federal custody. The petitioner, Seitz, was a prisoner in the custody of the United States Marshal, and he had been convicted of a crime in the state of Pennsylvania. Seitz had filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court, but the United States Marshal had refused to obey the writ. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court could not interfere with the federal government's exercise of that right. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court could not interfere with the federal government's exercise of that right.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Seitz v. Mitchell, arguing that the majority's decision was not supported by precedent or logic. He argued that a contract between two parties should be enforced according to its terms and conditions, regardless of any subsequent changes in law or policy. In this case, he noted that the contract had been entered into prior to Congress passing legislation which would have prevented it from being fulfilled as written; thus, he believed it should still be enforceable under existing laws at the time of execution. Furthermore, Justice Field argued that if Congress intended for such contracts to become void upon passage of new legislation then they would have included language explicitly stating so within said legislation - something which did not occur here. As such, he concluded that enforcing this particular contract was both legally sound and necessary in order to uphold principles of fairness and justice among individuals entering into agreements with one another