Settlemier v. Sullivan was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court could issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in federal custody. The case arose when a prisoner, Sullivan, was arrested in California and charged with a federal crime. Sullivan then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a California state court, arguing that he was being held in federal custody without due process of law. The state court granted the writ, and the United States government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to detain a prisoner. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a prisoner's detention, and not to challenge the merits of the underlying criminal charge. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner in federal custody. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to detain a prisoner.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Settlemeir v. Sullivan, arguing that the majority's decision was too broad and would lead to a dangerous precedent. He argued that while it is true that an individual cannot be held liable for damages caused by another person, this does not mean they are absolved of all responsibility when their negligence contributes to those damages. In this case, he believed there was sufficient evidence of negligence on behalf of both parties which contributed to the injury suffered by Mr. Sullivan; thus each party should bear some responsibility for his injuries and losses as opposed to one party being completely exonerated from any liability whatsoever. Justice Field concluded his dissent with a warning against allowing such sweeping decisions which could potentially open up individuals or companies who have acted negligently but were not directly responsible for causing harm or damage to escape without any consequences at all.