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In the case of Shaare Tefila Congregation et al. v. Cobb et al., 1986, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that Jews are a race for purposes of Section 1982 of Title 42 in United States Code, which prohibits racial discrimination in property rights. The plaintiffs were members of a Jewish synagogue whose building was vandalized with anti-Semitic graffiti and symbols by the defendants. They sued under Section 1982 but their claim was dismissed by lower courts on grounds that they did not constitute a race as per this law's definition. However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court, it held that when Congress enacted this legislation immediately after Civil War to protect newly freed black slaves from discrimination, it intended 'race' to be understood as per its meaning at that time - i.e., including ethnic groups like Jews who were considered distinct races then due to common ancestry or heritage even if not so now scientifically or socially.
In the dissenting opinion for SHAARE TEFILA CONGREGATION et al. v. COBB et al., Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice William Brennan, argued that Jews should not be considered a distinct race under federal law for purposes of civil rights protections against racial discrimination. He stated that such an interpretation would distort both historical understanding and contemporary social reality about what constitutes a race. Instead, he suggested focusing on whether the defendants' actions were motivated by an intent to discriminate against Jews as a group - which could fall under religious or ethnic discrimination rather than racial discrimination - regardless of how one defines 'race'. The dissent also expressed concern about potential implications of classifying religious groups as races in terms of legal precedent and societal perceptions.