This case was a dispute between the Receiver of the Bank of the United States and Lewis, a former stockholder of the bank. The Receiver sought to recover a debt from Lewis, who had been a stockholder of the bank when it was dissolved. The Receiver argued that Lewis was liable for the debt because he had received dividends from the bank while it was still in operation. The Supreme Court held that Lewis was not liable for the debt because he had received the dividends in good faith and had no knowledge of the bank's insolvency. The Court reasoned that the Receiver had failed to prove that Lewis had any knowledge of the bank's insolvency at the time he received the dividends. Furthermore, the Court held that the Receiver had failed to prove that Lewis had received the dividends with the intent to defraud the bank. The Court concluded that Lewis was not liable for the debt and that the Receiver was not entitled to recover it from him. The Court's decision established that a stockholder of a dissolved bank is not liable for the bank's debts if he received dividends in good faith and without knowledge of the bank's insolvency.

In Shainwald, Receiver, and Others v. Lewis (1883), the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a receiver appointed by a court of equity had authority to bring an action in his own name against third parties who were not parties to the original suit. The majority opinion held that such actions could be brought if authorized by state law or necessary for the protection of rights vested in him as receiver; however, Justice Field dissented from this ruling on two grounds. First, he argued that receivers should only have those powers expressly granted them by Congress or state legislatures since they are officers of courts created under their respective jurisdictions. Second, he asserted that allowing receivers to sue third parties would create too much uncertainty about when such suits could be brought and what claims they might include. He concluded that it would be better for all concerned if receivers were limited strictly to those powers specifically granted them by statute rather than being allowed broad discretion over which cases they may pursue in court