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15-5991 SHAW V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 781 F.3d 1130 CERT. GRANTED 4/25/2016 QUESTION PRESENTED: This case is an excellent vehicle to resolve the question left open in Loughrin v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2384 (2014), about which all of the circuits have now weighed in and remain openly, and increasingly, divided: Whether, for purposes of subsection (1) of the bank- fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1344, a "scheme to defraud a financial institution" requires proof of a specific intent not only to deceive, but also to cheat, a bank, as the majority of circuits -- nine of twelve -- have held and as petitioner Lawrence Shaw argued before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which instead joined the minority view in affirming his convictions for a scheme directed at a non- bank third-party. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 13-50136
In the 2016 case of Shaw v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that a scheme to defraud a bank falls under federal bank fraud statute even if the targeted funds are not owned by the bank. The defendant, Lawrence Shaw, was convicted for stealing over $300k from Stanley Hsu's Bank of America account through PayPal transactions. He argued that he did not violate federal law because his intention was to cheat Hsu and not Bank of America; therefore, he didn't intend to harm or risk any property interest owned by the bank itself. However, in an unanimous decision led by Justice Breyer, it was held that since banks have property rights in customer deposits (even though they also owe these amounts to their customers), schemes intending deception can fall within scope of federal statutes against banking frauds as such actions could potentially harm banks financially or reputationally.
In the dissenting opinion for Shaw v. United States, Justice Thomas argued that the majority's interpretation of 18 U.S.C §1344(1) was too broad and inconsistent with traditional principles of statutory construction. He contended that to establish a scheme or artifice to defraud a bank under this statute, it is necessary to show an intent not just to deceive but also cheat the bank; in other words, cause financial loss. In his view, Shaw’s actions were deceptive but did not necessarily aim at causing financial harm since he targeted a customer's account rather than directly aiming at bank property. Therefore, according to Justice Thomas' interpretation of the law and its legislative history, Shaw should not have been convicted under §1344(1). His dissent emphasized caution against expanding federal criminal statutes beyond their clear scope due to potential implications on individual liberty.