Shipman v. District of Columbia was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a person could be held liable for damages caused by a defective sidewalk. The plaintiff, Shipman, was injured when he tripped and fell on a defective sidewalk in the District of Columbia. He sued the District of Columbia for damages, claiming that the District was liable for the defective sidewalk. The Supreme Court held that the District of Columbia was not liable for the defective sidewalk. The Court reasoned that the District of Columbia was not responsible for the condition of the sidewalk, as it was not the owner of the sidewalk. The Court further held that the District of Columbia was not liable for the defective sidewalk because it had no duty to inspect or repair the sidewalk. The Court's decision in Shipman v. District of Columbia established that the District of Columbia was not liable for damages caused by a defective sidewalk. The Court's decision also established that the District of Columbia had no duty to inspect or repair sidewalks. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then, and has been used to establish that municipalities are not liable for damages caused by defective sidewalks.

In Shipman v. District of Columbia, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a contract between two parties could be enforced against one party when it had been made in violation of an existing statute. The majority opinion held that the contract was not enforceable due to its illegality under the statute. However, Justice Field dissented from this decision and argued that contracts should generally be upheld even if they are illegal unless there is some overriding public policy reason for invalidating them. He noted that while statutes can provide guidance on what types of contracts are permissible, they cannot always override private agreements between individuals or companies as long as those agreements do not conflict with any constitutional provisions or other laws protecting public welfare and safety. Furthermore, he argued that allowing such contracts would help promote fairness by ensuring both parties receive something in exchange for their agreement rather than leaving one party without recourse after having relied upon another's promise