Shoemaker et al. v. Kingsbury was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1871. The case involved a dispute between two parties over a contract for the sale of a farm. The plaintiff, Shoemaker, had entered into a contract with the defendant, Kingsbury, to purchase a farm for $2,000. The contract stated that the purchase price was to be paid in two installments, with the first installment due at the time of the signing of the contract. Kingsbury failed to make the first payment, and Shoemaker sued for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that the contract was valid and enforceable, and that Kingsbury was liable for breach of contract. The Court found that the contract was clear and unambiguous, and that Kingsbury had failed to fulfill his obligations under the contract. The Court also held that Kingsbury was liable for damages, and ordered him to pay the full purchase price of the farm, plus interest. The decision in Shoemaker et al. v. Kingsbury established that contracts are binding and enforceable, and that parties who fail to fulfill their obligations under a contract are liable for damages. The case also established that contracts must be clear and unambiguous in order to be enforceable.

In the dissenting opinion of Shoemaker et al. v. Kingsbury, Justice Strong argued that the majority had incorrectly interpreted a Pennsylvania statute which allowed for an exemption from taxation on certain property owned by religious organizations. He believed that this interpretation was too narrow and failed to recognize other types of property which should also be exempt from taxation under the law, such as buildings used for educational purposes or those used to house charitable institutions like hospitals and orphanages. Furthermore, he noted that it was not necessary for these properties to be directly connected with worship services in order to qualify for tax exemption; rather they could still serve a public purpose even if their primary use was not related to religion. In conclusion, Justice Strong felt that the majority's decision did not adequately consider all aspects of the case and thus should have been more expansive in its ruling regarding what constituted taxable versus non-taxable property under Pennsylvania law.