Simmons v. Ogle was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a state court could issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, John Simmons, was held in a federal prison in the state of Tennessee. Simmons sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, arguing that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy for violations of federal law, and that the state court did not have the power to enforce federal law. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Simmons v. Ogle, arguing that the majority had misinterpreted and misapplied a prior Supreme Court decision in order to reach its conclusion. He argued that the earlier case of United States v. Throckmorton did not stand for the proposition that an individual could be held liable for a debt incurred by another person without their knowledge or consent, as was being argued by Ogle's counsel. Instead, Justice Field asserted that Throckmorton only applied when there was evidence of fraud or collusion between two parties to defraud creditors; no such evidence existed here and thus it should not apply. Furthermore, he noted that even if it were applicable here, then Ogle would still have been entitled to relief since she had acted innocently and without any intent to deceive her creditors - something which is required under Throckmorton before liability can attach itself onto someone else's debts. In sum, Justice Field concluded his dissent by asserting that Ogle should have been granted relief from her obligations on this matter due to lack of fault on her part and because she had already suffered enough hardship through no fault of her own